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I
Introduction:
A legal community’s attitude toward a specific tool of practice in criminal
law, such as plea bargaining, can have significant effects on the manner in which
lawyers and judges practice criminal law and on the potential outcomes of
defendants. Research and observation in a Broward County, FL courtroom has
shown that most lawyers and judges depend on the use of criminal pleas to
maintain a steady flow of cases and to ensure that only the most serious cases
are given the time, energy, attention and expense of a trial.1 The practitioners,
including even the most rigidly ideological prosecutors, acknowledge that they
need to plea out most of the less serious criminal charges to ensure justice
without incurring an unmanageable backlog of cases. But those who are in
positions of power, such as legislators, judges or state attorneys, will often tweak
the plea bargaining environment to suit their socio-political philosophy about
crime and punishment. They achieve this by making it difficult or easy for
defendants to make plea arrangements or by adding restrictions to a judge’s or
assistant state attorney’s discretion on sentencing or charging decisions.2
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The nature of plea bargains changed over time because of this tweaking.
Tough prosecutorial policies and numerous minimum sentencing guidelines that
have evolved over time make it more difficult for public defenders to successfully
negotiate a lesser punishment for their clients’ guilty plea.3 One Broward County
assistant public defender said that plea arrangements lack room for negotiation
when a state attorney or a judge act rigidly on theirpolicy or are given little room
to wiggle on a policy that they did not establish themselves.4 Although politicians
and the public demand that prosecutors and judges should be tough on crime,
the lack of at least some flexibility on the part of prosecutors and judges can
have detrimental effects on the criminal system. This is especially true if the lack
of flexibility causes defendants to refuse to plea en masse, so that defendants
are effectively holding lawyers and the court hostage to the added case
pressure.5
This essay will explore the attitudes of a few local practitioners toward
plea bargain practice and will compare their attitudes to Milton Heumann’s
discovery of practitioners’ attitudes in Connecticut jurisdictions in the 1970s.6
Part II of the essay will show that although lawyers in Broward County who
practice thirty years later hold the same beliefs about the need for plea
bargaining, they do not necessarily make the same jaded comments about
smaller cases. Current practitioners look at ple
a bargaining as a necessary tool
of “exploring punishment availability” more than they see it as an escape valve
for cases that are difficult to try or not worth trying.7
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Heumann also argues that caseload pressure is not the significant reason
that most criminal cases do not go to trial.8 Part III of the essay will show that
despite Heumann’s theory, the practitioners’ belief that the plea arrangement
system greatly alleviates lawyers’ and judges’ caseloads still persists. It is
because of the immortality of this belief that most defendants serve lesser
sentences than they would have if they were convicted in trial.9 A state executive
summary reviewing the effects of Alaska’s attempt to ban plea bargain practice
will also shed some light on the case pressure theory.10 The bans successes
seem to confirm Heumann’s objection to the case pressure argument but its
failures might support the belief that plea bargain practice alleviates caseloads.
Alaska is the only state that enacted a general ban on plea arrangements.
Parts IV and V are brief visitations to the possibility of abuse of the plea
arrangement system and to an experimental pre-trial settlement conference
program that was conducted in Dade County thirty years ago.11 These two
concepts sometimes spur questions about the structure of the plea arrangement
system. The purpose of these two parts is to merely echo an alarm that
researchers often ring about weaknesses in the criminal justice system, and to
add some context to this paper’s big picture of plea bargain practice. The
conclusion in Part VI will show that despite some uproar that existed in the mid20th century about alleged overuse of plea bargains, the practice is still accepted
today as a staple of criminal law.12 It is the acceptability of this practice, despite
the public’s general dislike for plea bargains, which makes reduced sentences
possible for the majority of relatively minor criminal charges.
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II
Attitudes About The Big Picture:
Today’s attorneys seem to show a more positive attitude toward plea
bargain practice and they face a public that might be somewhat more accepting
to the concept of plea bargains than thirty years ago. Public defenders often fight
for and reasonable state attorneys often fish for the “best available sentence” for
each defendant.13 Lawyers and judges feel that when plea bargains are
appropriate, they each serve their respective interests properly. But one
complaint that many current practitioners have is that prosecutors and judges
have far less discretion in charging and sentencing decisions than was available
thirty years ago. This lack of discretion makes it difficult for defense attorneys to
negotiate a lesser sentence when circumstances compel them to seek such
reductions. This is one factor that can dampen practitioners’ attitudes toward
plea bargain practice.
Heumann’s study showed that, in the 1970s, many judges and attorneys
in busier jurisdictions felt that most of the plea-able cases were “garbage cases”
or the result of “Mickey Mouse crimes.”14 Prosecutors and defense attorneys
often said, “Nickel-and-dime cases are not seen as being worthy of extensive
plea negotiations.”15 Had defendants overheard such jargon, they might have felt
that the attorneys were slighting the defendants’ personal situation and did not
care whether they would receive a just outcome. A defendant who has no prior
record or only one prior conviction might hold a more catastrophic view of his fate
than the lawyers would when he faces a long-term loss of liberty. Even clients
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who willingly take a three- or five-year prison term after a successful plea
bargain, knowing that they would have faced a stiffer sentence had they lost in a
jury trial, would need to warm up to the idea that they will lose their liberty.
Current attorneys in Broward County characterize their reasons to plea in
a somewhat different manner. Although they acknowledge that plea
arrangements move the volume of cases efficiently, current practitioners do not
display a lack of willingness to work hard for smaller cases. They merely talk
about how much it takes to prepare for the larger cases that will go to trial.
Prosecutors and defense attorneys clamor that it seems they are always
preparing for a trial.16 Today’s lawyers insist that they only consider plea
arrangements, if they think it is the right thing to do, after evaluating a
defendant’s prior background, strength of the case, and seriousness of the
offense.17 One assistant state attorney compared trial preparation to practicing
hard for an important varsity sports event.18 He said he was operating on three
to four hours of sleep per night for a case that he was currently preparing. The
prosecutor observed that preparation is far more taxing than the actual trial, and
that lawyers simply want to go home and watch TV after trying even a simple
drug possession case.19 Public defenders have similar sentiments about the
need to thoroughly prepare for a case that will go to trial. They believe that
having thirty to forty open case files at a given time is far more manageable than
having three or four times as many active triable cases because of the
preparation required for each case.20
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But the lack of discretion for prosecutors and judges can sometimes
dampen the legal community’s attitude toward plea bargain practice. Defense
attorneys have little to worry about their own discretion because they are only
responsible to their clients. But defense attorneys feel that strict policies in the
state attorney’s office and a plethora of legislated sentencing guidelines have put
a chokehold on the plea arrangement environment. There is no longer room for
negotiation because of minimum sentencing guidelines that do not take into
account extenuating individual circumstances.21 The Florida 10-20-Life statute
dictates that a person convicted of pointing a gun gets a minimum of ten years in
state prison for each offense committed. The Broward County courthouse saw
the case of a Nathaniel Samuels in Summer 2003, where the defendant was
charged with eleven counts of armed robbery. Samuels was a middle-aged man
with no prior criminal history who suffered a breakdown after his wife died under
tragic circumstances.22 Although Samuels would have served 110 years if he
was convicted of all counts, he will serve twenty years because of his plea
arrangement. But the circuit judge who presided over the case believed the
resulting sentence was still too harsh, and it made him feel as if the sentencing
scheme was always on “auto-pilot” because of the minimum sentence statutes.
These statutes are a product of legislative response to many judges’ alleged
failures to do their job.23
A circuit judge in Broward County believes that the Broward County State
Attorney’s Office has such rigid policies that it is more difficult to plea bargain
with its assistant state attorneys than with their counterparts in Dade County. A
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person facing a cocaine delivery charge in Broward County will routinely be
offered eighteen months in state prison despite the lack of a prior criminal
background.24 The State Attorney’s Office knows that most defendants will
simply not take a plea when faced with such a sentence, and the defense makes
an open plea to the judge in the hopes that the court will lower the sentence to a
fairer level of punishment. The Dade County State Attorney’s Office has no such
policy. Defendants in Dade County who face the same charge are simply
released on probation if the defendant has no prior background. The circuit
judge said he too would rather give a similar defendant two years probation. “If
he violates the probation then he should go to prison,” he said. “Or else if he
never violates the probation then God bless him.”25 Another reason that defense
attorneys in Broward County find it difficult to plea for a lesser sentence is that
prosecutors are wholly answerable to their supervisors. The assistant state
attorneys have very little discretion in the court room and often reply to defense
attorneys’ requests with, “I cannot do that, I have to ask my supervisor.”26 Public
defenders become extremely frustrated when they successfully reason with an
assistant state attorney toward a plea arrangement, but cannot procure an actual
agreement because of restrictions to the prosecutor’s decision-making authority.
Current practitioners have for the most part shown a strongly positive
attitude toward plea bargain practice because they see it as a very effective tool
for case count control. But lawyers and judges do show frustration when they
cannot use their discretion to treat an exceptional case differently, and it is
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sometimes a source of tension between prosecutors and defense attorneys
during plea negotiations.
III
Judicial Economy Argument:
Lawyers and judges have always pointed to case volume flow and
efficiency as the direct result of plea bargain practice.27 Practitioners strongly
believe that they would face a crushing case volume if the plea arrangement
system did not exist. But Heumann disputes this belief and has held on to his
theory for more than thirty years.28 Despite his insistence that the practice of
taking pleas for most of the cases will never have a connection with the overall
judicial economy, the legal community will likely continue to believe that plea
bargains alleviate case pressure. Heumann says little about what else is the
likely reason that the majority of criminal cases plea out, other than the fact that,
“Cases are different that go to trial than those that plea.”29 But he does briefly
posit in his Connecticut study that court personnel assume that “90 percent of the
defendants in the court are factually guilty,” and such people are rewarded by the
system with a lower sentence if the defendants plea guilty.30
Circuit judges only have so many days to try cases and would rather not
deal with relatively smaller cases when the judges could devote time to serious
cases.31 One judge estimated that because of his daily dockets of plea-able
cases, he only has 150 to 175 days per year available to try serious cases.32 A
courtroom also faces significant down time if a defendant in a serious case pleas
guilty or nolo contendere in the middle of trial because judges often clear their
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schedules for one or more days to make room for the trial.33 It is because of
these sometimes aggravating chain of events that judges feel they are at a loss
for adequate trial time. The prosecutors themselves set the pace and case
volume by deciding which cases to try and when to offer a plea arrangement.
But even they complain about “an already clogged system in which the attorneys
would be exhausted all the time” were it not for the judicial economy achieved
through plea bargain practice.34 Even when an assistant state attorney only has
fifteen cases in a seven-month period in which he had to pick a jury, the
prosecutor feels that he is always preparing for cases.35
But to break the legal community from its strongly held belief in the case
pressure argument, Heumann attempted to make a statistical analysis comparing
large and small jurisdictions in his Connecticut study. Heumann also studied the
effects on plea bargain practice in Connecticut after court jurisdiction for felony
cases that involved up to five years in state prison were realigned.36 When the
circuit courts began taking such felony cases, the superior courts were relieved
of a significant burden and were able to concentrate on serious crimes that were
punishable by more than five years in state prison.37
The study assumed that the legal community believes that if there were a
lower volume of cases in a given court, then a higher percentage of cases would
be in trial. The statistical analysis was molded to address that assumption, and it
showed that between the years 1880 and 1954, the Connecticut courts with low
case volume “did not try substantially more cases than the high volume courts.”38
Heumann concluded that there was a negligible difference in trial rates despite a
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large difference in actual case pressure.39 He also observed that sometimes lowvolume courts tried proportionately fewer cases than high-volume courts.40
The study’s second test, which compared the caseloads of Connecticut
superior courts before and after jurisdiction realignment, returned an even more
dramatic rebuttal to the case pressure theory. The superior courts employed the
same number of judges and state attorneys after jurisdictional realignment as
they did before, even though they processed two thousand fewer cases between
June 1972 and June 1973 than in the previous year.41 This allowed Heumann to
“examine the impact of the relative decrease in case pressure on specific
superior courts” when the personnel levels were constant.42 He found that the
three busiest superior courts still had the same rate of trials even though their
case pressure was half of what it was the previous year, and the results in lower
volume courts were mixed but still constant in the eye of statistical standards.43 It
is because of these two tests that Heumann was convinced that case pressure
has no relationship with the rate at which case disposition is achieved by plea
bargain.
But Heumann agreed with most legal scholars that there was no case for
banning plea bargains because it is impossible. One reason is that the “guilty
plea is legally protected, and concessions to the defendant who pleads guilty
may readily be justified in terms other than saving the state time and money.”44
But a national commission had called for general bans on plea bargain practice
and Alaska was the one state that acted upon that recommendation.45 The
state’s attorney general enacted the ban in 1975 through an inter-office
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memorandum forbidding all state attorneys who work in state courts from
engaging in charge bargaining or sentence bargaining with defendants, except
with “sexual abuse or assault cases, drug cases, and those involving
informants.”46 The ban affected almost all courts in Alaska because only
Anchorage and Fairbanks have any municipal courts, and because the Alaskan
justice system is highly centralized.47 The Alaska Judicial Council’s study
showed that the ban caused police work to improve because state attorneys
were now solely responsible for filing charges against a defendant. Prosecutors
engaged in screening, which meant they sifted through arrests and filed charges
only under the standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt” instead of probable
cause. This triggered police to investigate cases more thoroughly lest their
felony referrals to prosecutors were rejected. The entire scheme resulted in a
somewhat lighter case volume throughout the courts and a higher rate of cases
going to trial.48
But the ban suffered from two major failures. Although sentence
bargaining disappeared, charge bargaining returned in full-swing ten years after
the ban and began to play a more significant role in court than before the ban.49
The Alaska Judicial Council acknowledged the state was too ambitious to strictly
prohibit charge bargaining, and it concluded that the overall policy against plea
bargain practice had decayed over the years.50 The decay became especially
acute when Alaska’s two episodes of economic recession made the state
increasingly conscious about the expense of taking such a high ratio of cases to
trial.51 The other failure was that prosecutors in some parts of Alaska ignored or
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misinterpreted the general ban, with the district attorney in one jurisdiction
believing that plea-bargaining was just “frowned on to some degree.”52 Many
rural jurisdictions just found plea-bargaining unavoidable in their localities and
hardly changed their practice after the ban. Localities in the Alaskan Bush that
adhered to the ban were sometimes seen as overly sensitive to the statewide
policy.53
It is safe to assume that some of the failures of Alaska’s ban on plea
bargain practice are largely the function of lawyers’ and judges’ attitudes toward
the practice. Only a minority of practitioners opposes the concept of using plea
bargain practice as a tool of efficiency whether or not the case pressure theory
holds any water. The judicial economy argument will probably prevail among
practitioners and legal scholars who support the use of plea bargain practice.
They might also perceive Alaska as an exceptional jurisdiction that harbors a
different legal culture and handles far fewer cases than a jurisdiction such as
Florida. The Broward and Dade counties in Florida have such an immense
criminal case load that they might not have the flexibility necessary to institute a
general ban on plea bargain practice even as an experiment.
IV
Potential Room For Abuse:
The plea arrangement system leaves some room for unscrupulous
criminal defense attorneys, especially those in private practice, to use a criminal
plea for their personal gain. One critic of the current state of criminal malpractice
laws cited a case involving a guilty plea as prime example of what could
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happen.54 In the example given, Johnie Gibson’s representatives Jerry
Cunningham and Douglas Trant asked Gibson to persuade his co-defendants to
hire the same two lawyers for their selves. The co-defendants hired Cunningham
and Trant, and then the two lawyers coerced Gibson to plead guilty to the federal
drug charges in exchange for what they said would be a paltry eight to ten years
in prison.55 Gibson could not win his lawsuit against Cunningham and Trant
because the civil court ruled, “the guilty defendant is entirely to blame for his
predicament and is the sole proximate cause of any injury sustained as a result
of his conviction.”56 Duncan proposes that criminal malpractice law should be
reformed by allowing, “criminal malpractice claimants to file their claims
contemporaneously with any post-conviction proceedings.”57 This may have the
effect of closing one loophole that allowed abuse of the plea arrangement
system.
But such behavior does trigger some questions. Can some private
practice attorneys resort to plea bargains, not only to push case volume to earn a
living, but also to avoid the possibility of facing malpractice inherent in a risky trial
where a lawyer could make mistakes?58 If so, does that mean less scrupulous
lawyers or lawyers engaging in defensive-practice can negligently overlook the
possibility that any given client might be better served if the attorney took the
risks of a trial?59 What about the potential for abuse where “private defense
counsel may have an economic incentive if their fee is the same whether the
defendant pleads or goes to trial?”60 Finally, one question that was frequently
raised by scholars and active practitioners is whether certain tactics in plea
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bargain practice can sometimes give the appearance that “justice is for sale.”61
There may be some value in studying whether such practices exist in South
Florida despite the state’s strict ethical standards, and whether they are frequent
or rare.
V
Fate of A New-Age Experiment:
When plea bargain practice became unpopular and the National Advisory
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recommended that plea
negotiations be abolished, Dade County, FL became an ideal jurisdiction for an
experimental alternative to plea arrangements. The National Institute of Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice, under the U.S. Department of Justice, acted
upon a 1974 proposal that “judges should play a more active role in plea
negotiations and that victims and defendants should be invited to participate in
these discussions.”62 The experiment involved a taking a random sample of
1,074 felony cases in Dade County from February 1977 to February 1978, of
which three hundred and seventy-eight were assigned to pre-trial settlement
conferences and the rest were in a control group, and comparing the satisfaction
of lay parties including the victim, defendant, and arresting police officer.63
Cases that were assigned to pre-trial settlement conference were handled in a
more business-like manner as if an arbitration between two corporations were to
occur. A conference was held in the judge’s chambers instead of in the
courtroom, the judge wore a business suit instead of a robe, and all parties were
able to give their input before decisions were made.64
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The results of the experiment were inconclusive because the National
Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice could not find another
jurisdiction in the United States willing to participate in the experiment, so the
institute was stuck with examining only one sample jurisdiction.65 The lack of
another sample jurisdiction was compounded by Dade County’s existing pre-trial
intervention program, which had been in effect since 1972 and had many striking
similarities to the pre-trial settlement conference experiment.66 The only
difference was that Dade County’s existing program did not have judicial
involvement in the process. The Institute acknowledged that the pre-existence of
Dade County’s pre-trial intervention program “reduces the differences in
treatment between test and control cases. This may make the results less
noticeable than they would be in a jurisdiction which did not utilize these
techniques.”67 The one positive remark that the Institute could make was that the
program worked, that all lay parties were generally more satisfied than in
conventional proceedings, and that the experiment “did not place undue stress
on the felony disposition process in Dade County.”68
Current practitioners spoken to for this essay professed no knowledge
about the Dade County pre-trial settlement experiment, but one assistant public
defender showed some visceral opposition to the idea of a judge actively
participating in the negotiation of a defendants’ fate. She said the nature of
conventional plea-bargaining is almost the opposite of pre-trial settlement
conferences because a judge is supposed to be a neutral and detached
magistrate.69 The assistant public defender suggested it would be appropriate
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for a judge to be nominally involved in a plea negotiation “at the request of one
party.” A typical scenario would involve the prosecutor’s refusal to offer a lower
sentence when the defense believes the standing offer is unfair to the defendant,
and the defense attorney asks the judge for an opinion on the offer.70
The pre-trial settlement conference, as an alternative to conventional plea
bargain practice, is not likely to gain popularity in Broward County based on the
initial reactions of a small sample of practitioners. But the concept might be
worth re-experimenting with cases where defendants only face restitution as a
penalty because pre-trial settlement conferences have an ambiance that is
similar to arbitration proceedings.
VI
Conclusion:
Current practitioners in Broward County would make staunch defenders of
the plea arrangement system as the core of their criminal law practice. The plea
bargain practice is such a strong institution in the American criminal justice
system that it would be impractical to abolish. Practitioners are heavily
dependent on plea negotiations for their efficiency and for leveraging on behalf of
their respective interests, and veteran lawyers cannot recall a time when pleabargaining was not the norm.71 Heumann’s study showed that plea bargain
practice existed for at least one hundred years prior to his work, and a Miami
attorney remarked that even the medieval Joan of Arc faced a plea negotiation
when the English captured her.72 The overall attitude of Broward County judges
and lawyers is more positive toward plea bargain practice and far less jaded
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about smaller, less serious cases than Connecticut practitioners interviewed in
Heumann’s study. It is possible that today’s practitioners are hiding some of their
more cynical attitudes because of modern workplace demands for
professionalism and political correctness. But the few interviews showed that the
judges and lawyers were sincere in their efforts to achieve the best possible
result for their respective interests.
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